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The 100th anniversary of the Parliament Act 1911has coincided with the publication of the latestattempt at reforming the composition of the House
of Lords. The Coalition Government’s White Paper and
draft Bill on House of Lords Reform (Cm 8077) is the
latest in a long line of reform attempts since the 1911 Act,
which curtailed the power of the House and which in its
preamble stated the intention “to substitute for the House
of Lords as it at present exists a Second Chamber
constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis
[although] such substitution cannot be immediately
brought into operation”. Over the years, committees,
reports and Bills have come and gone (including those of
Viscount Bryce in 1918, the Wilson Government in 1968
and Lord Home in 1978). The Life Peerages Act 1958
successfully breathed new life into the House (as the
Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 had done with regard to
Law Lords some decades before), delaying the impetus for
further reform. However, the tempo increased under the
New Labour Government 1997 – 2010, and there have
now been four White Papers since the House of Lords Act
1999 saw the removal of all but 92 hereditary peers (which
was intended to be stage one of a two stage reform process
to be completed within five years (Lord Irvine, HL Deb,
vol 602, col 24, June 15, 1999)).
A common theme of most, if not all, of these reports has
been that the existing House of Lords does a good job and
that it is the composition – not the function – that needs
reform. Thus the 2011 White Paper holds that the reformed
House should have the same functions and same powers as
the existing House of Lords (paras 6–7), while having
injected into it the ‘fundamental democratic principle’ that it
should be wholly or mainly elected (para 13); this being, in
the words used by the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime
Minister in their co-authored foreword, a “unique
opportunity for our country to instil greater democracy into
our institutions”. The draft Bill, which runs to 68 sections
and nine schedules over 109 pages, aims to do this through
a series of convoluted provisions and transitional
arrangements. However, rather than setting out a package of
proposals representing radical “incremental reform” (para
1), the government’s aim of maintaining the status quo in
terms of function and power, while addressing the desire for
a more democratic house, could better and more simply be
met through an evolutionary, yet swifter, reform.
A FALSE CHOICE AND A SIMPLER
PROPOSAL
In posing a choice between a wholly or mainly elected
House of Lords (para 22), the government is posing a
potentially false choice. Election and appointment are no
more mutually exclusive states than election and
hereditament (as outlined in “House of Lords Reform:
Many Anniversaries and a False Dichotomy?” [2009] 4
Web JCLI). The Weatherill amendment to the House of
Lords Act 1999 saw the introduction of elected hereditary
peers (whereby, following the general abolition of the
hereditary peers’ right to sit and as a transitional measure
until final reform is settled, hereditary peers from each of
the parties and the cross-benches elected 10 per cent of
their then number to remain with a further 15 hereditary
peers elected by the whole house to act as deputy speakers
and the like). A modified replication of this concept for
life peers, with recurrent elections and where, while the
proportion of cross-benchers is fixed, the numbers of party
peers change according to, for example, either general or
local election results could provide a combination of the
benefits of election and appointment while mitigating
some of the problems with both. Such a relatively minor
evolutionary change to the membership of the House
would be better attuned to maintaining the current
position as to role and powers than the government’s
proposed revolutionary one (which risks unintended, if not
unforeseen, consequences).
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MATTERS OF SIZE AND COMPOSITION
The current White Paper proposes that the new House
of Lords should consist of 300 full-time, salaried members
(para 12). The draft Bill is framed on the basis that 80 per
cent of the members would be elected with the remaining
20 per cent being independent appointments approved by
a Statutory Appointments Commission (although the
White Paper also considers the alternative of all 300 being
elected; in either case they would be joined by 12 Church
of England bishops (proportionately cut down from the
current 26)). While there is an argument for a salaried and
full-time house to be smaller than the current size of nearly
800 (not least to keep the costs down), the White Paper
does not address the comparative value of full-time and
potentially part-time membership (beyond the statement
that “[t]he Government expects members of the reformed
House to be full-time Parliamentarians”) and nor does it
address, in any depth, the current attendance when
contemplating the size of the House.
In the era of the fostering of the Big Society, it seems
somewhat perverse to professionalise and severely narrow
down a body of highly talented, experienced and cost-
effective volunteers, with members who, while not
receiving the honour of a peerage, would receive nigh-on
£900,000 (at today’s prices) in salary over their likely 15
year term (members would be limited to serving one term,
which is expected to be three five-year Parliaments, in the
reformed House with the salary being greater than that
received by members of the devolved legislatures (paras 24
and 111)).
A House allowing part-time members would not, as at
present, need to be salaried, and would allow the members
to retain their active links with the real world and thus
better prepare them should they leave the House after a
number of years (a 15 year hiatus in any career could be
problematic unless members are expected to enter new
careers, for example lobbying, after their service).
The White Paper’s focus on average attendance – that
while there are 789 members the average daily attendance
in the 2009/2010 session was only 388 – is flawed in a
number of ways. Firstly, while the average is drawn from
the 2009/2010 session, the 789 figure is as of May 2011
and thus includes well over 100 new peers created since
the end of that session. Furthermore, such a focus ignores
both the breadth of experience that the House has within
it and the nature of averages: “300 full-time members”
could conceivably be able to “fulfil the same range of duties
as the current average daily attendance of 388” (para 12),
but they would not have the same experiences (both past
and current) as, and are unlikely to be able to fulfil those
duties to the same level as, a greater number of part-time
members who attend when their expertise and interest are
most of use. Based on the 2009/2010 attendance figures
(and excluding those peers who died or were introduced in
the period) the average peer attended 57 per cent of the
sessions (or 60% if those who did not attend at all are
excluded). The average daily attendance of 388 must thus
comprise very different people on different days and
constraining the House to 300 full-timers excludes many
more regular attendees than the juxtaposition of 300 and
388 suggests.
Under the evolutionary system suggested above
(whereby life peers are elected by their fellows, with a fixed
number of cross benchers and the parties’ numbers varying
according to election results, ie “Weatherill (as amended)
life peers”), the virtues of part-time membership could be
retained, the remuneration costs would not be increased
and the size of the House could be capped at a higher level
providing a greater range of representation. If a cut-off was
placed at 300, based on the 2009/10 figures it would see
peers who attended 73 per cent of the time excluded
whereas a cut-off of 500 would take the attendance down
to 44 per cent (of course there would be no cut-off as such
as the life peers would be elected but it is an approximation
of the lost experience at various sizes). Some form of cap
on the size of the House is necessary for practical reasons,
a Leader’s Group having been convened by Lord
Strathclyde to try to deal with the issue, and this system
would allow for regular modulation – obviating the
problem demonstrated by Hazell and Seyd (in “Reforming
the Lords: the numbers” [2008] Public Law 378 at 383) of
keeping a House of life peers proportional through new
creations after each election.
THE POSITION OF MINISTERS
The White Paper proposes that ministers should only be
drawn from the elected and transitional members (para
67), presumably because the appointed element are
independent. However, in order to provide the flexibility
of appointing ministers (which has been used to notably
good – and less good – effect in recent years) they then
propose that there will be ad hoc members who will have
membership only for the duration of their ministerial
appointment (para 68). A Weatherill (as amended) life
peers system would not need such an ungainly provision as
a similarly small number of peers could be created during
a Parliament and then face election among their peers in
what would be the usual way. Nor would it, as the
government’s proposal appears to do, preclude the albeit
rare possibility of independents acting as ministers.
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND TRANSITION
The “Weatherill (as amended) life peers” system would
meet the Coalition Agreement’s commitment to a system
of proportional representation for the reformed House of
Lords as the number of party members would change
proportionately to the election result used (which would
most likely be the general election but could alternatively
be local or European elections). Limited appointments
could be made during each Parliament, as at present, but
there would be no need for the Blairite and Coalition mass 3
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creations following changes of government. This indirect
election system would be more of a filter on the current
process of appointment, providing an element of
proportionality, and thus should not to any great degree
involve the problems of attracting a sufficient calibre of
candidate which is often leveled against an elected
subordinate House. Furthermore, while there would be a
democratic element injected into the House, the indirect
election of appointees to the peerage and the presence of
cross-benchers would restrict any claims to a greater
mandate and allow the balance between the Houses to be
preserved.
The White Paper’s proposals are far more radical (with
a number of peers, including Baroness Bothroyd, referring
to it as abolition – see eg HL Deb vol 719, col 1172, June
21, 2011). It would see either 80 per cent or 100 per cent
of the members being elected by single transferable vote
elections to the House, with one third of the House elected
at each election. The elections would take place on the
same day as the general election, risking confusion (as
happened with the Scottish elections). While doing so
would be cheaper than holding the elections on a separate
date, it is unnecessarily expensive to the meet the aim of
proportionality which could be achieved far more cheaply
by elections among peers under the Weatherill (as
amended) life peers’ system. Furthernore, such a system
would also be simpler than the government’s proposal to
create distinct House of Lords constituencies which will be
almost, but not fully, co-extensive with the European
regions (para 43) and avert voter fatigue.
As the White Paper proposes that one-third of the
House would be elected at each general election, there
would need to be some transitional arrangements (paras
69–86). The Weatherill (as amended) life peers system
would not require any transitional arrangements; it could
be implemented swiftly and could even be introduced as an
amendment to Lord Steel’s House of Lords Reform Bill
currently, and it seems perennially, before the House (Lord
Steel has introduced versions of the bill in the 2006/2007,
2007/2008 and 2008/2009 sessions). The Bill seeks to
reform leave of absence and abolish hereditary peer by-
elections, and originally sought to create and guide an
independent appointments commission. An amendment,
akin to the 1999 Weatherill amendment, could easily be
made and constitute final reform. The White Paper
outlines three options for transition, none of which
admittedly last as long as that in the first option in the
previous administration’s last White Paper (Cm 7438),
which would take until the middle of the century, but it is
nonetheless still a lengthy period, taking 15 years to take its
final form (with elected and either a decreasing proportion
of current members or, under option 2, all current
members sitting side-by-side until then). A larger,
potentially part-time, voluntarily House comprising much
of the same members as now would avoid such an
elongated transition.
CONCLUSION
The draft Bill arguably transforms the House of Lords
into a democratically legitimate second chamber –
although the need or desirability for the second chamber to
be democratically elected is by no means undisputed – but
it does so at an unnecessarily high cost (both financial and
experiential) and level of complexity. The government
could meet their stated aims through a simpler and faster
change which could see many of the recognised virtues of
the current House maintained, a democratic element
introduced, the problem of a growing House solved and
reform completed, not just under way, by the time of the
next election.
• This article is an extended version of a submission to
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the draft
House of Lords Reform Bill.
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